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Abstract – The National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) has pursued a number of structural testing projects that 
are intended to provide data that can be used to substantiate the position that U. S. Department of Energy(DOE)spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters, made from austenitic stainless steels, can maintain containment after an accidental drop event 
and that plastic finite element methods can be used to accurately predict the structural response of canister configurations 
not specifically tested. In particular, drop tests of full-scale canisters and material impact testing at varying strain rates 
reflecting accidental drop conditions have been completed or are in progress. This paper provides insights to conclusions 
achieved to date and what efforts are planned to fully address the pertinent issues necessary to demonstrate the safety of 
DOE SNF canisters subjected to accidental drop events. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Accidental drop events impose such high structural 
loads that the design of radioactive waste or spent nuclear 
fuel (SNF) canisters are typically governed by these 
impact loads. If the canister is required to satisfy stress-
based design criteria for these accident conditions, final 
designs could incorporate significant wall thicknesses 
having reduced loading volumes or require the use of 
internal or external impact limiters. These design options 
are costly, increasing the number of required canisters or 
result in complicated impact limiter handling procedures, 
especially if radiation dose rates to personnel are a 
concern. However, with the appropriate choice of 
materials and designs, canisters can be developed that 
carry adequate amounts of radioactive material and be 
demonstrated to maintain containment after drop events, 
even though high strains (greater than 25%) may result in 
the containment boundary material. This approach is 
being pursued for Department of Energy (DOE) SNF 
canisters when handled at the proposed surface facility for 
the Yucca Mountain Project. Although developed for 
interim storage and transportation uses as well as 
repository disposal, it is usage at the nation’s repository 
that is expected to be the most structurally challenging, 
due to potential accidental drops. 
II. WORK DESCRIPTION 
DOE has developed two distinct canister designs for 
the eventual repository disposal of DOE SNF. The 
National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) at the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has funded efforts in 
1999 [1] and 2004 [2 and 3] to drop test full-scale 
representative spent nuclear fuel canisters in order to 
determine the actual structural response and leakage rate 
of these dropped canisters. Test specimens representing 
457-mm (18-inch) standardized DOE SNF canisters and 
modified versions of the 610-mm (24-inch) standardized 
DOE SNF canister as well as Hanford’s Multi-Canister 
Overpack (MCO) were tested. Both the MCOs and the 
standardized DOE SNF canisters are collectively referred 
to as the DOE SNF canisters. 
II.A. 1999 Drop Testing of 457-mm (18-inch) 
Standardized DOE SNF Canisters 
Starting in 1998, the NSNFP funded efforts to 
develop both a 457-mm (18-inch) and a 610-mm (24-
inch) diameter standardized DOE SNF canister, shown in 
Figure 1, for the DOE SNF inventory not designated for 
the MCO canister and excluding U.S. Navy SNF. The 
canister design (similar for both diameters) incorporated 
an energy-absorbing skirt that deforms on impact during 
accidental drop events, providing a significant amount of 
protection to the actual containment boundary of the 
canister, including the welds. This deformed skirt can 
even be removed (cut off) if necessary without disrupting 
the canister containment, enhancing the canister’s ability 
to still fit into other containers after a drop event. After 
preliminary proof-of-concept testing, nine representative 
457-mm (18-inch) diameter test specimens were built at 
the INL, and drop tested in 1999. In 1999, 610-mm (24-
inch) standardized DOE SNF canisters were not expected 
to be used. The internals used for the drop tests (typically 
a pipe with protruding plates, referred to as a spoked-
wheel) were chosen to challenge the containment 
boundary of the representative test canisters. An internal 
sleeve was typically placed into the test canisters. The 
sleeve would normally be incorporated for those instances 
during actual use where sharp-edged SNF or baskets 
would impinge directly on the interior of the canister. The 
sleeve would reduce the resulting localized strains and 
increase safety margins. Reinforcing bar (rebar) was used 
to simulate the SNF and to increase test canister weights 
to the maximum limits. The internal impact plates (both 
top and bottom) were designated to be axially held in 
place via the baskets or other appropriate internals or 
contents.  
Seven of the nine 457-mm (18-inch) test canisters 
were dropped from 9 m (30 feet) onto an essentially 
unyielding surface at Sandia National Laboratories. The 
two remaining drop tests were a 1-m (40-inch) drop onto 
a 15-cm (6-inch) diameter puncture bar and a 0.6-m (2-
foot) drop onto a representative waste package or 
transportation cask lip. 
Fig. 1.  Illustration of the Standardized DOE SNF 
Canister. 
II.B. 2004 Drop Testing of 610-mm (24-inch) Modified 
Standardized DOE SNF Canisters 
Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation 
(FWENC) [later renamed Tetra Tech FW, Inc.], under 
contract to DOE to build an interim SNF storage facility 
at the INL, was to use the standardized DOE SNF canister 
design with their interim storage facility. In 2002, 
FWENC decided to use both the 457-mm (18-inch) and 
the 610-mm (24-inch) canister sizes and to modify the 
design of each. This modified design is hereafter referred 
to as the Idaho Spent Fuel Project (ISFP) canister. 
Pre-test analytical predictions [4] of the modified 
design resulted in higher strains than those analytically 
predicted in the 1999 457-mm (18-inch) standardized 
canister drop tests. Therefore, efforts were pursued 
starting in 2004 to drop test representative full-scale test 
specimens of the 610-mm (24-inch) ISFP canister design. 
The following highlights a number of the significant 
design modifications made by FWENC to the 610-mm 
(24-inch) diameter canister: 
1. Use of non-standard vessel heads with a nominal 
19-mm (¾-inch) thickness requiring machining 
to match the 610-mm (24-inch) diameter, 12.7-
mm (½-inch) thick shell geometry, 
2. Incorporation of an internal shield plug with and 
without a welded support ring, 
3. Welded retaining rings for the internal impact 
plates,
4. No internal sleeves were used. 
Two representative test canisters, reflecting the ISFP 
canister design, were designated to be fabricated and 
tested. The INL procured material, fabricated the test 
ISFP canisters and internals, loaded the ISFP test 
canisters, and completed the final closure weld. The 
internals reflected an actual ISFP canister design to be 
used for the Shippingport Reflector Rod. These internals 
consisted of a bottom spacer made from 508-mm (20-
inch) Schedule 60 pipe with 25.4-mm (1-inch) thick 
plates top and bottom, a spoked-wheel assembly made 
from 203-mm (8-inch) Schedule 100 pipe and 12.7-mm 
(½-inch) thick plate (replacing the Shippingport Reflector 
Rod), rebar, and a shield plug made from 581-mm 
(22.875-inch) diameter bar stock and 508-mm (20-inch) 
Schedule 60 pipe. 
Both of the ISFP test canisters were subjected to 9-m 
(30-foot) drops onto an essentially unyielding surface at 
Sandia National Laboratories. Impact orientations were at 
a 45-degree angle and at a 70-degree (from vertical) angle 
to achieve a slapdown event. 
II.C. 2004 Drop Testing of Multi-Canister Overpacks 
During the late 1990s, the Hanford site developed the 
MCO, a SNF canister to be used for moving N Reactor 
and other Hanford SNF from older storage facilities near 
the Columbia River to safer, interim storage facilities 
away from the river at Hanford. Over 400 of these MCOs 
have been loaded and moved to the newer canister storage 
building at Hanford. The MCOs initial design purpose 
was to only move the Hanford SNF away from the 
Columbia River and place it into interim storage. 
However, DOE wants to evaluate if the MCOs could also 
be used to transport the SNF to the repository and be 
disposed at the repository, without having to reopen or 
repackage the MCOs. Due to this identified repository 
use, the NSNFP decided to pursue a drop testing effort to 
demonstrate the structural response of a typical MCO and 
to gain insights into the ability of a dropped MCO to 
maintain its containment (to not breach). (Fluor Hanford 
was the M&O contractor at the DOE Hanford Site during 
this effort. In this paper, all work will be referred to as 
having been performed at or by “Hanford.”). 
Figure 2 illustrates the configuration of a typical 
MCO. The MCO is a stainless steel (304L) cylindrical 
vessel approximately 610 mm (24 inches) in diameter and 
4.2 m (166 inches) long. SNF is placed into one of four 
types of baskets (either an intact SNF or a scrap fuel 
basket for either Mark 1A and Mark IV fuel). Structural 
integrity is required for the Mark 1A baskets for criticality 
control whereas the Mark IV baskets do not require 
structural integrity for criticality control. A fully loaded 
MCO holds five or six baskets (depending on type) and a 
shield plug fixed in place with a locking ring. A cover cap 
is welded on to the top-end to complete the package. Over 
400 of the existing MCOs have had this cover welded on. 
A fully loaded MCO can weigh as much as 9070 kg (10 
tons). 
Fig. 2.  Illustration of the Multi-Canister Overpack. 
Each test MCO had four test baskets (a large solid 
bar installed on a representative Mark IV basket post and 
bottom plate) and a fifth representative basket consisting 
of a typical Mark IV basket loaded with 63-mm (2-1/2-
inch) diameter bars that represented separate pieces of the 
SNF. These steel weights were machined at the INL and 
then shipped to Hanford where they were loaded into 
actual MCOs and sealed closed following standard 
procedures. These two test MCOs were then shipped back 
to the INL for final drop test preparation. 
The representative test MCOs were dropped tested 
following the defined repository drop events [5]. One test 
MCO was dropped 8.2 m (27 feet) (vertical orientation) 
and the other was dropped 0.6 m (2 feet) (worst case 
orientation of 60 degrees for a slapdown event), each onto 
an essentially unyielding surface at Sandia National 
Laboratories. 
II.D. Material Impact Testing 
Since the structural responses of the representative 
test canisters clearly involved high strains (greater than 
25%), the plastic analyses performed needed to accurately 
reflect the strain rate effects of the materials used in the 
test canisters (304L and 316L stainless steels). However, 
the mechanical characteristics of these materials under 
dynamic (impact) loads in the moderate strain rate range 
of concern (10 to 200 per second) are not well 
documented. A 20% increase (of the stresses) was 
assumed in the associated material true stress-strain 
curves used for input into the drop test computer analyses 
to account for strain rate effects. However, justification of 
that elevated true stress-strain curve was deemed 
necessary. 
Therefore, additional work funded by the NSNFP has 
commenced at the INL to improve the understanding of 
moderate strain rate phenomena on these canister 
materials. Utilizing a drop-weight Impact Testing 
Machine (ITM) and relatively large test specimens (up to 
12.7-mm [1/2-inch] thick), test efforts to date have 
focused on the tensile behavior of the stainless steel 
materials during impact loading. Impact tests at varying 
strain rates, including 25 per second [6], were performed 
for comparison to their quasi-static tensile test properties. 
Current efforts have focused on material testing at 
nominal room temperatures. 
The ITM will also be used to investigate material 
impact responses at varying cold and elevated 
temperatures of both base and welded materials. Material 
aging and flaw effects on material impact responses can 
also be investigated using the ITM. Determining these 
material impact responses that reflect the condition of the 
material when the canisters are being handled at the 
repository surface facility is important for proper 
structural evaluations. 
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Fig. 3.  Photograph of the Impact Testing Machine. 
III. RESULTS 
III.A. Drop Testing 
The 1999 and 2004 drop tests demonstrate that the 
457-mm (18-inch) and 610-mm (24-inch) standardized 
DOE SNF canister and ISFP canister designs are indeed 
robust and can survive a 9-m (30-foot) drop onto a flat, 
essentially unyielding surface or a 1-m (40-inch) drop 
onto a 15-cm (6-inch) diameter puncture bar. Helium leak 
testing demonstrated that these dropped canisters could 
also maintain a leaktight containment (less than 10-7 std 
cc/sec).
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate typical structural 
responses of a dropped standardized DOE SNF test 
canister and the analytical predictions of that same test 
canister. Analytical predictions of deformations were 
typically within 10%.  
The MCO drop tests resulted in very little significant 
deformation of the MCO canister shell. However, the 
baskets were expected to experience significant 
deformation. Figure 7 shows the structural response of the 
bottom basket in the vertical test MCO drop and the 
analytical prediction. Analytical predictions of the basket 
deformations were within 5%. Helium leak testing 
demonstrated that the dropped MCOs did not breach.  
These results show that current finite element plastic 
analysis techniques can be used to predict the structural 
deformations of canisters that are subjected to accidental 
drop events. However, these predictions can be improved 
with material definitions that consider strain rate effects. 
III.B. Material Impact Testing 
Elevated true stress-strain curves (reflecting strain 
rate effects) for the two stainless steel materials were 
determined using a “total impact energy” approach. This 
approach considered the deformation energy required to 
strain the specimens at a given strain rate. Two methods, 
based on energy content per material volume, were 
evaluated to map the elevated true stress-strain curves 
from the quasi-static curve, a factored method and a 
shifted method. Figure 8 shows an example of the 
resulting elevated true stress-strain curves (factored and 
shifted) for 304L material in comparison to the quasi-
static true stress-strain curve (determined using typical 
tensile test methods) and the quasi-static curve increased 
by 20% (of the stresses) as was done for the analytical 
evaluations supporting the canister drop tests. All four of 
these true stress-strain curves were incorporated into 
analytical simulations of the actual impact tests to 
determine the validity of the elevated curves. Excellent 
agreement (deformations within 1 to 3 % difference) was 
achieved with both the factored and the shifted elevated 
true stress-strain curves. These analytical results were 
better than the results obtained using just the quasi-static 
curve (31% difference) or the 20% increased quasi-static 
curve (8% difference). 
Fig. 4.  Vertical drop of 457-mm (18-inch) standardized test canister response (left) and analytical prediction (right). 
Fig. 5.  Forty-five-degree drop of 457-mm (18-inch) standardized test canister response (left) and analytical prediction 
(right). 
Fig. 6.  Puncture drop of 457-mm (18-inch) standardized test canister response (left) and analytical prediction (right). 
Fig. 7.  Bottom basket of vertically dropped MCO (left) and analytical prediction (right). 
(Cuts in the basket shroud are from post-drop examination efforts.) 
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Fig. 8.  True stress-strain curves comparison for 304L material at 25/second strain rate. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The DOE SNF canisters are engineered barriers with 
safety as their first and foremost goal. These canisters can 
be disposable (placed directly into a repository waste 
package) and will simplify the handling of DOE SNF at 
the repository by not having to reopen the canisters, 
thereby reducing personnel exposure. Most importantly, 
drop testing representative full-scale specimens of these 
DOE SNF canisters has demonstrated the ability of DOE 
SNF canisters to maintain containment (not breach) 
following the drop event. Analytical evaluations of the 
drop tests have been performed and the results match well 
with the canister deformations. Insights regarding the 
justification of elevating the analytical true stress-strain 
curves to reflect strain rate effects in those analytical 
evaluations have also been obtained. Although the 
material impact testing results are considered preliminary 
(since further strain rate testing is necessary), the results 
to date indicate that elevated true stress-strain curves yield 
more accurate analysis results. Once all of the proposed 
material impact response data has been obtained, the 
canister material properties can be more accurately 
quantified, reflecting aged material and temperature 
conditions when the DOE SNF canisters are actually 
being handled at the repository surface facility. This will 
permit more accurate analytical evaluations that can be 
used as the basis for demonstrating the safe use of DOE 
SNF canisters. 
NSNFP sponsored work to date at the INL has 
physically demonstrated that, with proper design and 
materials, canister containment can be maintained after 
accidental drop events that result in high plastic strains. 
The NSNFP work has also shown that canister inelastic 
evaluations can potentially replace the need for expensive, 
full-scale, physical drop tests. 
Although currently there are potential design changes 
under discussion for the nation’s spent nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste repository, achieving the 
final required safety goals of the Yucca Mountain Project 
is still paramount. The work described herein can be used 
to help support safety evaluations for a variety of final 
repository design options due to the need to consider 
accidental drop events when canisters are being handled. 
Much of the work described herein can also be applied to 
the commercial SNF to be transported to and handled at 
the repository. Results from this work can help gain 
regulatory as well as public acceptance of the repository. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work was supported by the U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Environmental Management (National 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Program) under DOE Idaho 
Operations Office Contract No. DE-AC07-05ID14517. 
REFERENCES 
[1] D. K. MORTON, S. D. SNOW, and T. E. RAHL, 
FY1999 Drop Testing Report for the 18-Inch 
Standardized DOE SNF Canister, DOE Report, EDF 
NSNF-007, Revision 2, September 5, 2002. 
[2] D. K. MORTON and S. D. SNOW, Drop Testing 
Representative 24-Inch Diameter Idaho Spent Fuel 
Project Canisters, DOE Report, EDF-NSNF-045, 
Revision 0, January 28, 2005.  
[3] D. K. MORTON and S. D. SNOW, Drop Testing 
Representative Multi-Canister Overpacks, DOE 
Report, EDF-NSNF-047, Revision 0, January 28, 
2005. 
[4] S. D. SNOW and D. K. MORTON, Analytical 
Evaluation of the Idaho Spent Fuel Project Canister 
For Accidental Drop Events, DOE Report, EDF-
NSNF-027, Revision 0, September 30, 2003. 
[5] DOE Report, Waste Acceptance System 
Requirements Document, DOE/RW-0351, Revision 
4, January 2002. 
[6] R. K. BLANDFORD and T. E. RAHL, FY 2004 
Material Strain Rate Testing, DOE Report, EDF-
NSNF-042, Revision 2, April 19, 2005. 
NOTICE 
This paper was prepared as an account of work 
sponsored by an agency of the U. S. Government.  
Neither the U. S. Government nor any agency thereof, or 
any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or 
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility 
for any third party’s use, or the results of such use, of any 
information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in 
this report, or represents that its use by such third party 
would not infringe privately owned rights.  The views 
expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the 
U.S. DOE. 
